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WITHDRAWING JURISDICTION FROM
FEDERAL COURTS
CHARLES E. RICE*

Courts today generally accept two assumptions in their interpretation of the Constitution. They first assume that the judiciary is
the only branch of the government which has definitive power to
decide what the Constitution is. The second assumption, related to
the first, is that the language of Supreme Court opinions is
somehow of the same stature as the language of the Constitution
itself. Remember, it was not until 1958 in Cooper v. Aaron' that
even the Supreme Court said that its decisions were the law of the
land. But we see this operating. And I think we ought to be careful
not to overstate the case. I am convinced that the exercise of power
by Congress to remove the appellate jurisdiction in these areas is
both constitutional and desirable.
Now, there are problems. I have no problem at all with someone
who disagrees with me on prudential grounds and says, "I don't
think it's a good idea." There are problems with it. For example,
the limitation of Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction would not
overturn the cases that Congress was objecting to. They would remain and presumably the courts would then be free to decide
whether to follow them or not. They might follow them, they
might not.
The proposals in the abortion area, for example, would act as
damage control measures, since they would effectively withdraw
the federal courts' jurisdiction to decide such cases. Our federal
courts currently accept the notion that some human beings are
nonpersons, simply because the Court said whether or not the unborn child is a human being, he's a nonperson. We have a regime
under which every year we wipe out the equivalent of the combined populations of Kansas City, Miami and Minneapolis. Now,
when somebody wants to take away the power of the Supreme
Court to work further mischief, it's not a broad scale attack upon
the Constitution. It is rather a surgical removal of jurisdiction.
We are dealing here with a form of boot strap jurisprudence on
the part of the Supreme Court. As Berger, 2 Fairman3 and others
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have demonstrated, the fourteenth amendment was not intended
to apply the Bill of Rights to the states. If you have any doubt
about that, particularly with respect to the establishment clause,
consult the history of the fourteenth amendment.
The Supreme Court has invented the incorporation doctrine. In
the process it has applied against the states not only the provisions
of the Bill of Rights, but rights that were never even envisioned by
the Framers, such as the right of reproductive privacy, which the
courts found lurking in the penumbras formed by the emanations
from the Bill of Rights.
The Supreme Court has also invented the notion that it's unconstitutional for a public official to pray. This would be a surprise to
the Framers of the Constitution who, between September 22 and
24, 1789, did two things. They first approved the first amendment
and then they called on the President to pray.
I think it's quite important for us to look at this and say,
"Look, a constitutional amendment is a very difficult and long,
important process." There is something wrong with the notion
that says that every time we disagree with the Supreme Court's
decision, we must amend the Constitution, unless our assumption
is that every Supreme Court decision is equivalent to the Constitution itself.
The question ultimately becomes whether the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Constitution can ever be wrong. The answer
is "yes." We only have to consult the history of Swift v. Tyson 4
and the Erie decision 5 to see that. So unless we are going to accept
the assumption that the Supreme Court is the exclusive arbiter of
what the Constitution means, and that its opinions have the same
status as the language of the Constitution, then we ought not to get
paranoid about the consideration by Congress of the exercise of its
powers under article III, section two. It is a legitimate power of
Congress.
Believe me, I'm not claiming that it is something that is without
problems. There are problems, both implementation problems and
possible problems of precedent. These are all things that would
come into the consideration of the decision, the prudential decision as to whether it's a good thing to do it. In future years as these
proposals come up, I hope that the rhetoric will be toned down so
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that we will at least address ourselves to it as a question of prudence, rather than regarding it as a confrontation involving the
very survival of the Constitution itself, because it is simply within
Congress' power. Whether it should be exercised is of course a debatable question, but that's what the debate should be about.

